Protection against Corruption
Annex III section 1.1.9 applies when corruption of a connection, hardware component, software, data, or configuration can affect compliance with the essential health and safety requirements. It is not a general IT-security clause. It is a machinery-safety requirement.
Corruption is tied to hazardous situations
The first sentence sets the safety boundary. A connection to the machinery or related product must not lead to a hazardous situation. The connection can be through another device, through a feature of that device, or through a remote device that communicates with the machinery or related product.
The machinery or related product shall be designed and constructed so that the connection to it of another device, via any feature of the connected device itself or via any remote device that communicates with the machinery or related product does not lead to a hazardous situation.
Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, Annex III section 1.1.9
The phrase matters because it keeps the analysis anchored in machinery safety. A corrupted value matters when it can change the safe behaviour of the machinery, not merely because the value is stored in a networked system.
Protected elements
Section 1.1.9 names several protected elements. The common condition is their connection to the relevant essential health and safety requirements.
- a hardware component transmitting signal or data, when relevant for connection or access to critical software;
- software and data that are critical for compliance with the relevant essential health and safety requirements;
- software installed on the machinery or related product that is necessary for safe operation;
- software, software modifications, and configuration changes when evidence of intervention is required.
Critical software and data
The Regulation does not protect all software and data in the same way. It focuses on software and data that are critical for compliance with the relevant essential health and safety requirements. In practice, this points to safety-related logic, safety limits, parameter sets, drive configuration, robot configuration, firmware, and data used by a safety-related control function.
Software and data that are critical for the compliance of the machinery or related product with the relevant essential health and safety requirements shall be identified as such and shall be adequately protected against accidental or intentional corruption.
Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, Annex III section 1.1.9
The exact words cover both accidental and intentional corruption. A mistaken parameter upload and a deliberate malicious change can both be relevant if the same corrupted element can create a hazardous situation.
Intervention evidence
Section 1.1.9 is not only a preventive-control requirement. It also expects evidence of legitimate or illegitimate intervention in relevant hardware, software, software modifications, or configuration. The evidence point is narrower than a general security audit log. It concerns intervention that can affect safety-relevant software, data, or configuration.
Evidence object
The evidence should show that a relevant action or event happened, such as a software update, configuration change, or hardware access affecting critical software.
Safety link
The record is useful only when it links the intervention to a safety-relevant function, parameter, version, or configuration.
Machinery examples
Typical examples are safety-specific. They should be selected from the machine architecture and risk assessment, not from a generic threat catalogue.
Engineering access
Local or remote engineering access matters when it can change safety limits, safety modes, safety logic, or safety parameters.
Firmware and application logic
Firmware images and safety-related application software matter when they support safe operation or safe stopping.
External communication
Fieldbus, Ethernet, Wi-Fi, service-tool, HMI, cloud, or memory-card paths matter when corruption can affect a safety state.
Configuration integrity
Drive parameters, robot limits, safeguarded space settings, and safety PLC configuration matter when altered values can defeat a protective measure.
Control system link
Annex III section 1.2.1 reinforces the same boundary for control systems. Control systems must prevent hazardous situations and, when appropriate to the circumstances and risks, withstand intended and unintended external influences, including reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts from third parties that lead to a hazardous situation.
That does not turn every malicious act into a machinery-safety issue. It means the control-system analysis must include malicious attempts when the attempt can compromise safe control behaviour.